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Introduction 
The increasing influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the global economy 
has led civil society organizations (both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
labor unions) to demand that TNCs increase their responsibilities for social 
development (Anderson and Cavanagh 1996; Frenkel 2001; Korten 2001; van Tulder 
and Kolk 2001).  Sometimes willingly and oftentimes reluctantly, TNCs have 
accepted this demand for extended responsibilities, giving rise to what is known as the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement (van Tulder and Kolk 2001; Sethi 
2002). 
 
The CSR movement has resulted in, and has been built around, several influential 
transnational initiatives that define the principles of responsible business practice.  
One of the most important of these initiatives is the UN Global Compact, which has 
been signed by more than 2,500 companies and numerous NGOs (Cavanagh 2004; 
Kuper 2004).  The UN Global Compact sets out ten principles relating to human 
rights, workers’ rights, environmental protection, and corruption.  Its launch marked 
“a major turn in development thinking.  After decades of hostile relations, the UN and 
business now acknowledge their common interest in the promotion of sustainable 
development” (Thérien and Pouliot 2006, 55; cf. Kuper 2004).  An underlying 
assumption of the CSR movement, of which the UN Global Compact is a critical part, 
is that TNCs can become allies promoting “a more sustainable and inclusive global 
economy,”1 particularly in developing countries.   
 
There is already extensive research into CSR firms’ practices in developing countries 
(Frenkel 2001; Egels-Zandén 2007), but this research rarely, if ever, analyzes the link 
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between these firms’  practices and political liberalization.  This article addresses this 
gap through an empirical study of the operations of a Nordic TNC, hereafter referred 
to as ‘Nordix,’ 2 in China. The findings suggest the relationship between CSR and 
political liberalization is more complex than advocates of CSR typically assume.  
Specifically, the study shows that CSR-driven economic globalization can promote 
political liberalization within a TNCs’  internal operations.  Nonetheless, it also shows 
that TNCs’  policy to separate business and politics decouples, and potentially even 
counteracts, the globalization-liberalization link outside the corporate boundaries.  
This is especially so in countries, such as China, with strong national governments 
and restrictive political liberalization agendas.  
 
The article focuses on China because it is one of the countries where political 
liberalization is perceived as most needed.  Nordix was chosen for study because 
Nordic firms are regarded as the front-runners in the CSR movement (Morsing, 
Midttun and Palmås 2007), and this particular firm is ranked as one of the best Nordic 
CSR firms.  Nordix is thus representative of leading CSR firms and provides an 
excellent opportunity for examining the social development resulting from the work 
of a proactive TNC.  Nordix is a large manufacturing company with sales and 
production units all over the globe.  It has been present in China for several years and 
operates numerous units there.  Data have been collected by document analysis, more 
than 100 interviews with Nordix top-management, middle-management and 
employees as well as international and local stakeholders in Europe and China, and 
observations in Europe and China. 
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CSR Principles and Practices 
Like other TNCs, Nordix has operationalized its CSR commitment in numerous 
policies and initiatives.  Among the most important of these is the company code of 
conduct, which is drafted in accordance with the principles of the UN Global 
Compact.  Briefly, Nordix’ s code of conduct states that the company should comply 
with existing UN and International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions regarding 
human rights and workers’  rights.  These UN and ILO principles are, in turn, closely 
linked to ideals of individual rights, democracy, and, some would claim, a Western 
form of civilization (Donnelly 1989; Renteln 1990; Tomuschat 2003).  Hence, it is 
easy to see why the UN, NGOs, labor unions and academics regard corporate 
adoption of these principles as integrating economic globalization with political 
liberalization. 
 
The globalization-liberalization link is to a great extent observed in Nordix’ s 
operations in China, where the company complies with strict Chinese labor law while 
also respecting its corporate code of conduct.  Consequently, the principles of the UN 
Global Compact are implemented in Nordix’ s operations in China.  There is little of 
the decoupling between the company’ s espoused CSR principles and actual corporate 
practices (also known as ‘greenwashing’  or ‘bluewashing’ ) that occurs in other TNCs 
(Sethi 2002; Egels-Zandén 2007).  In combination with human resource practices that 
emphasize employee participation, training, continuous improvement, and the like, 
this principled approach makes the experience of working at Nordix very different 
from many local Chinese firms.  Like other TNCs, Nordix has also started to demand 
that the CSR principles be adopted by their Chinese suppliers, thus offering further 
support to the argument that the presence of TNCs that espouse CSR promotes human 
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rights and political liberalization (van Tulder and Kolk 2001; Sethi 2002; Egels-
Zandén 2007). 
 
Nonetheless, there is one aspect of Nordix’ s operations that is inconsistent with its 
code of conduct and the principles of the UN Global Compact – the absence of 
freedom of association.  While several of the factories owned by Nordix or by its 
suppliers in China do have labor unions, all these unions are affiliated with the All 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  Given that ACFTU is the only legally 
allowed Chinese labor union, this is perhaps to be expected.  However, the situation 
highlights a key issue in terms of the influence of TNCs in developing countries. 
Nordix accepts the prevailing Chinese laws and has no intention of challenging them.  
Consequently, it gives compliance with local laws priority over applying the 
principles of the UN Global Compact.  In fact, Nordix’ s code of conduct states that 
Nordix does not in any way interfere in the host country’ s domestic politics.  
Consequently, Nordix not only refrains from questioning the Chinese ban on 
independent labor unions, but it also refrains from questioning or even discussing 
political developments.  As one Nordix manager put it: “ I would never ever in any 
situation at any time discuss politics in China.  It is the one thing that I do not talk 
about.  We are not in China to engage in politics.  We are in China to engage in 
business.  This is Nordix’ s very clear policy position.”   Nordix’ s non-involvement in 
politics is not restricted to China. It is its corporate policy and, consequently, Nordix 
does not interfere in politics in Denmark, Russia, the US, China or any other country.  
 
This framing of corporate responsibility as not including involvement in any political 
issues outside the boundaries of internal and supplier corporate governance is not 
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unique to Nordix.  Several other large Nordic TNCs make similar claims of neutrality 
with regard to politics.3  At least implicitly, this separation is also consistent with the 
UN Global Compact and the dominant thinking in the general CSR movement. 
Indeed, Nordix is rarely, if ever, criticized for its “ neutral”  position vis-à-vis national 
politics.  Business and politics are framed as separate and independent.  Similar 
separations are made in, for example, the debate about sports responsibility in the 
2008 Olympics in China, where individual organizations claim that sports are 
unrelated to politics, and that they thus have no responsibility to intervene in political 
development in China.  
 
Interestingly, in business the separation of business and politics is only present outside 
the boundaries of the corporation and its suppliers.  Within these boundaries, TNCs 
are expected to uphold and promote UN Global Compact values that are closely 
linked to liberal and democratic ideals of social development.  This division between 
internal and external matters and the focus on influence inside but not outside these 
boundaries can be linked to the modern notion of a corporation (Latour 1993; Palmås 
2005).  Hence, it is an integral part of contemporary construction of “ the corporation,”  
making it highly influential and difficult to challenge. 
 
The separation between business and politics is one potential explanation for the 
limited political liberalization of China despite extensive economic globalization.  At 
the very least, it indicates that the oftentimes assumed link between corporate 
adoption of responsible business practices and political liberalization is questionable 
outside the realm of corporations’  own operations and those of their suppliers. 
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TNCs Entwined in Politics 
The case of one of Nordix’ s largest factories in China illustrates well the entwined 
relations of TNCs and politics.  This joint venture factory was set up in the 1990s after 
extensive negotiations between the top management of Nordix and Chinese 
government officials.  As one manager at the Chinese partner noted, it did not choose 
Nordix.  Rather, Chinese government officials chose Nordix and instructed them to 
set up a joint venture with it.  The reason for this extensive government involvement 
was that the industry in question is vital for economic development in China, and the 
joint venture was envisioned as central to the development of this industry.   
 
Nordix was not the only partner considered.  The Chinese government’ s choice of 
Nordix was related to its reputation as a skilled company, and also to it being Nordic.  
While other producers of similar products (e.g., US firms) were perceived by Chinese 
government officials as entwined in national politics too critical of the Chinese 
government, the Nordic country’ s relatively supportive position towards the 
Communist regime was viewed as positive.  This indicates that Chinese officials 
believed that Nordix and Nordic governments would exert only limited pressure on 
the Chinese government in terms of political liberalization. 
 
The Chinese joint venture partner is a state-owned enterprise and part of the Chinese 
Ministry; in other words, it is part of the Chinese government.  Interestingly, the joint 
venture’ s customers are also part of the Ministry.  Since the industry in question is 
highly regulated, the Ministry has decision-making power in terms of market share, 
sales prices, new product approval, etc.  Logically, this has led to frequent, and 
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sometimes extensive, interactions between Nordix and the Ministry, in which the 
development of the joint venture and the industry have been discussed. 
 
The joint venture structure, which gives the Chinese partner over 40 percent 
ownership, also gives the Chinese government influence in the company’ s internal 
operations.  The Chinese partner can, for example, nominate a deputy general 
manager.  So far, this manager has always been a Communist Party member.  Besides 
participating in operational decision-making, this deputy general manager is 
responsible for the company’ s Communist Party committee.  This committee consists 
of over 100 managers within the company (thus, nearly all the managers) and serves 
as a forum for communication and advancement of the Communist Party agenda.  
Since Nordix does not “ interfere”  in politics, both Nordix and the Chinese partner 
recognize that the operations of the Communist Party committee cannot be financed 
by Nordix.  Instead, financing is channeled from Nordix’ s payments to the trade union 
(which is also closely linked to the Communist Party and reports to the deputy general 
manager) and from there to the Communist Party committee.  Additionally, the 
company’ s board members from the Chinese side have always been Party members. 
 
These measures mean that the Communist Party has extensive knowledge of the 
company’ s operations.  It also has the ability to influence the company’ s operations: 
internally, through the trade union, the deputy general manager, the Party committee, 
and the company board; externally, through the Ministry’ s control of prices, market 
share, product approvals, etc.  Hence, the Communist Party has been able to oversee 
any changes Nordix has made in the company’ s operations.  This does not imply that 
the Party has explicitly attempted to influence the company’ s operations.  As the 
 9 
majority owner, Nordix has assumed management responsibility.  Rather, it means 
that the Communist Party has retained several platforms of influence and information 
over Nordix’ s operations. 
 
In sum, the joint venture has helped the economic development in China by 
improving both the performance and quality of products in this industry.  This 
Nordix-induced economic development has had few links with political liberalization. 
Although internal operations have changed, external political development remains 
unchallenged.  This study even indicates that the official separation between business 
and politics can serve to uphold the influence of the Communist Party.  The 
Communist Party was forced to open up to foreign know-how in this industry in order 
to develop the Chinese economy, making it vulnerable to external pressure.  However, 
due to Nordix prevailing separation of business and politics, the Communist Party was 
never challenged.  It was able to achieve its economic objectives while preserving its 
control and influence over China’ s political development. 
Conclusion 
The CSR movement claims that if TNCs adopt responsible business practices, 
political liberalization will follow.  This study of Nordix – one of the leading CSR 
firms globally – shows that this claim is valid as regards TNCs’  internal operations.  
Nordix is certainly doing more internally for human rights and workers’  rights than 
most other firms.  However, the study also shows that leading CSR firms and the CSR 
movement in general – at least implicitly – accept the separation of business and 
politics in the host country.  This separation decouples, and potentially even 
counteracts, the link between economic globalization and political liberalization.  
Although Nordix is more explicit than most TNCs in its separation of business and 
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politics, most Nordic and international TNCs adopt practices similar to that of Nordix 
regarding political involvement (particularly in politically sensitive markets such as 
China).  Hence, this study’ s results are not only applicable to Nordix, but indicate that 
the CSR movement’ s focus on TNCs’  internal and supplier operations risks 
undermining its claim to closely link economic globalization and political 
liberalization. 
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1
 www.unglobalcompact.org (Accessed 7 December 2006). 
2
 ‘Nordix’  is a anonymized name that has no reference to either the studied TNC’ s name or any 
potential firm and/or organization actually named ‘Nordix’ . 
3
 This conclusion was reached by the author after reading through numerous Nordic TNCs’  codes of 
conduct. 
